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SUMMARY & CONCLUSIONS 
It has long been well known that actual system reliability 
typically falls well short of early estimates.  Failure rates are 
often ten or more times higher than anticipated.  Many reasons 
have been given for this, but over-optimism is the fundamental 
cause of too-favorable reliability predictions.  Most forecasts of 
reliability are essentially best-case scenarios, as are predictions 
of budget and schedule.  Confident engineers assemble 
estimates bottom-up, including the known factors and ignoring 
problems that they hope won’t happen.  Traditional reliability 
estimation is based on simply summing up the component 
failure rates.  This ignores most actual failure causes. The way 
to reduce over-optimism is to use the historical system level 
failure rate from similar projects.  Adjustments should not be 
made based purely on engineering judgment, but only if there 
is so logical quantitative justification.  The traditional 
component-based reliability estimate is useful as a lower bound 
on the system failure rate. The difference between this lower 
bound component-based reliability and the historical system 
level reliability indicates how much of the total failure rate is 
due to system level problems rather than component failures.   
1 INTRODUCTION 
The traditional system failure rate estimate is simply the 
sum of the component failure rates.  Actual failure rates are 
usually higher and often much higher, showing that this failure 
rate estimator is inaccurate.  The failure causes that make actual 
reliability fall short of the estimated reliability are well-known 
and include problems in design, manufacturing, operations, and 
management.  Failures are caused by design errors, interface 
problems, system level effects, unanticipated environmental 
effects, and operator error.  Specific problems include 
misunderstood operational environment, use of low reliability 
components, manufacturing quality problems, inadequate and 
unrealistic testing, inaccurate reliability prediction techniques, 
inconsistencies in failure classification and data collection, and 
short term management focus on cost and schedule leading to 
insufficient effort to improve reliability.   
These failure causes are difficult to anticipate and estimate, 
but they inevitably appear in the system level failure rate data.  
The actual level of failures not caused by components depends 
on the system design maturity and the organizations reliability 
knowledge and effort.  There is an over-optimistic tendency to 
assume that historical failure rates can easily be improved.   
 
1.1 Over-optimism 
The component-based reliability estimate is readily 
accepted as reasonable because of a natural optimism bias, the 
observed fact that estimates are usually too close to the best 
case, which Kahneman calls the planning fallacy.  A way to 
avoid over-optimism is to base reliability estimates on the 
actual reliability of similar projects [1].   
Although the general failure causes are well known, it 
seems very difficult to make accurate reliability predictions.  A 
first step in reducing over-optimism can be made by simply 
multiplying the best-case failure rate by a factor of 10 or 20, as 
suggested by historical experience.   
The initial failure rate estimate can be corrected using 
actual failure rate data obtained during test and operations.  The 
inverse of the system failure rate is the system Mean Time 
Before Failure (MTBF).  Initial testing often produces infant 
mortality, occurring well before the estimated system MTBF.  
The highest failure rate causes have the shortest MTBFs and 
cause the earliest failures.  Early failures are often due to design 
or component selection errors which are usually diagnosed and 
fixed, in a process called reliability growth.  As some of the 
failure causes are corrected, the initial failure rate declines and 
may ultimately approach the best case failure rate based on the 
component failure rates.   
2 ESTIMATED FAILURE RATES ARE OFTEN MUCH 
HIGHER THAN ACTUAL FAILURE RATES 
There is usually a significant gap between predicted 
reliability and actual operational reliability.  One study of 
military avionics found that failure rates can be 7 to 20 times 
higher than predicted [2] [3].  The estimate produced by 
traditional reliability analysis is too low.   
3 TRADITIONAL RELIABILITY ANALYSIS 
Traditional reliability analysis assumes that the system 
failure rate is determined by the component failure rates.  
Failure rate data is collected in handbooks and reliability 
analysis using reliability block diagrams is used bottom-up to 
estimate the overall system failure rate.  If all components are 
needed and there is only one of each, and if the component 
failure rates are small, the system failure rate is the sum of the 
component failure rates.  When this approach was first 
established in the mid-1900’s, systems were much simpler and 
components such as electronic tubes accounted for nearly all 
the system failure rates.  Since then, much higher quality 
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components have reduced component-caused failures and 
greater system complexity has led to failures caused by 
problems in management, requirements, design, interfaces, 
manufacturing, and software.  These factors are not addressed 
in traditional reliability prediction methods. [4]   
4 EXPLANATIONS FOR THE RELIABILITY GAP 
The explanations as to why estimated failure rates are 
much lower than actual failure rates include two kinds of 
problems with traditional analysis.  The estimator assumptions 
can be questioned.  Only component failures are included.   
4.1 Objections to the usual reliability estimation assumptions 
Traditional reliability analysis makes several unrealistic 
assumptions.  They are that all system failures are due to 
component failures, that the failures are independent, that the 
component failure rates are accurately known, and that repair 
or replacement of a failed part returns the system to its original 
good-as-new condition.   
In reality, component failures are a small part of all 
reported failures.  Common cause failures are not independent.  
All spares of a particular component may fail for the same 
reason, an internal manufacturing fault or some excessive 
system stress.  Component failure rates are often optimistic 
underestimates.  Repairs may not restore the system to its 
original condition.  Repairs are often imperfect and they may 
introduce other defects leading to failures of other parts.   
4.2 Objections to component-based reliability estimation 
A system is much more than the sum of its parts.  An 
integrated system is designed to produce system level 
performance of a different kind than that of its components.  
Just as systems have system level performance, they have 
system level failures.  Yet “System integration and interfacing 
is seldom considered.” [2] “Many reported failures are not 
caused by part failures at all, but by events such as intermittent 
connections, improper use, maintainers using opportunities to 
replace 'suspect' parts, etc.” [2]  
A survey of “Experts’ Opinions on the Reliability Gap,” 
found some significant contributors were as follows:  
• Definitions – inconsistencies in failure classification and 
data collection 
• Design – use of low reliability components, lack of 
derating, interface problems, system level effects 
• Environment - misunderstood operational environment  
• Management – short term focus on cost and schedule 
leading to reduced reliability effort with little time and 
funds for testing, repair, and design correction 
• Manufacturing – quality problems, process errors, 
inadequate testing 
• Operations – misuse, accidents, operator error 
• Prediction - inaccurate techniques, assumptions, data [2]  
The causes for underestimated failure rates include the 
assumptions of the prediction techniques, lack of understanding 
the operational environment, manufacturing problems, design 
problems, and short-term management focus limiting design 
and test effort. [3]  The direct cause of actual high failure rates 
is the combination of high system complexity and limited time 
and budgets. [2] [3]  To this can be added a lack of 
understanding of how to design for reliability, of what is the 
best obtainable reliability, and how to achieve it within given 
budget and schedule constraints.   
5 OVER-OPTIMISM 
A fundamental cause of all overly favorable predictions is 
over-optimism.  The Nobel laureate, Daniel Kahneman, 
explored how humans think in his best-selling 2011 book, 
Thinking, Fast and Slow [1].  He found that planning estimates 
are usually over-optimistic, unrealistically close to the best 
case, and not based on similar cases.  Over-optimism usually 
persists beyond the planning phase of a project and into the 
execution phase.  Psychological optimism produces two effects, 
over-optimistic estimates and overconfidence that the low 
estimates will be met.  Over-optimism is not only not cured by 
increased subject matter expertise; it is encouraged! Good 
models and accurate data can help produce the illusion of 
certainty, predictability, and controllability.   
Kahneman mentions that the planning expert Flyvbjerg 
endorsed the idea of taking a broader or outsider view to cure 
the over-optimism as “the single most important piece of advice 
regarding how to increase accuracy in forecasting.” The outside 
view can be implemented by using the statistics of similar cases 
in a method called reference class forecasting.  Reference class 
forecasting simply focuses on the historical results of similar 
projects.  Overall historical top-down estimation is both much 
easier and much more accurate than detailed bottom-up 
estimation. [1]   
5.1 Over-optimism in cost and schedule estimates 
System cost and schedule, like failure rate, are often 
underestimated due to over-optimism.  Just as the system failure 
rate is often estimated bottom-up as the sum of the component 
failure rates, the system cost can be estimated as the sum of the 
component, design, integration, and test costs without failures, 
redesign, and retest, and the system schedule can be estimated 
as the sum of sequential development task times without 
allowance for failures causing rework and retest or externally 
imposed delays.  Several different top-down cost estimators 
exist for aerospace systems, but user adjustments for difficulty 
and use of engineering judgment often introduce over-
optimism.  Actual costs and schedules can be several times the 
original estimates, and failure rates are typically many times 
higher than the original estimates.   
Frequently cited reasons for poor estimates are poor 
estimating methods and lack of good data.  This certainly 
applies, but if it was the only cause of error, estimates would 
sometimes too pessimistic, and this rarely happens.  Over-
optimism causes too low cost, schedule, and failure rate 
estimates.  Kahneman notes that “The optimism of planners and 
decision makers is not the only cause of overruns.” “Errors in 
the initial budget are not always innocent.” [1]  Project 
advocates may assume that the cost, schedule, and performance 
requirements are soft and that additional time and money can 
be provided or requirements reduced if needed.   
6 ENGINEERING JUDGMENT CANNOT BE TRUSTED 
Engineers develop a trained judgment and can produce 
highly effective intuitive decisions simply by following their 
gut.  An engineering judgment comes to mind with a feeling of 
rightness but without obvious reasons.  There are several 
problems with using engineering judgment.  It has  no conscious 
basis, so the reasons behind it cannot easily be explained.  
Intuitive judgments seem obviously right and are strongly 
emotionally held, so it is difficult to challenge them.  Over-
confidence and over-optimism often distort engineering 
judgment. The problems of engineering judgment can be 
reduced by using logical, fact-based analysis. [5]   
6.1 NASA shuttle failure analysis was over-optimistic 
A contractor study of space shuttle risk found the solid-fuel 
rocket boosters had a failure rate of about 1 in 40.  However, 
rather than use this historical data, NASA made an “engineering 
judgment” and “decided to assume a failure probability of 1 in 
1,000” or even 1 in 10,000. [6]  An Air Force review noted that 
the “arbitrary assignment of risk levels apparently per sponsor 
direction” had “no quantitative justification at all.”  The Air 
Force found that the boosters’ track record “suggest[s] a failure 
rate of around one-in-a-hundred.” [6]   
NASA’s internal analysis also minimized risk.  A failure in 
the solid rocket booster (the failure that destroyed Challenger) 
was assigned a probability of 1 in 100,000. [6]  Even after the 
Challenger accident, the NASA chief engineer thought the 
actual risk “would be 10 to the minus 5 … based on engineering 
judgment.” [6]  After Challenger, risk analysis found that the 
actual probability of a fatal accident was about 1 in 100. [7]  The 
simple direct use of historical data would have been far superior 
to using engineering judgment in this extreme case of over-
optimism.   
7 REDUCING OVER-OPTIMISM  
The suggested cure for over-optimism is to base estimates 
on actual historical data from similar projects.  Traditional 
reliability estimation neglects many failure causes.  Even for 
components, there is an optimistic tendency to assume that 
historical failure rates can be easily improved.   
Reliability estimates can be made more realistic by basing 
them very closely on actual historical data from similar 
projects.  The major problem is finding similar projects with 
relevant data.  Adjustments from similar project’s data should 
be based only on observable quantitative differences, such as 
design generation, parts count, and test hours.  It would be 
helpful to provide two estimates, the traditional best-case 
estimate based on bottom-up summation of parts failure rates 
and a top-down estimate based on historical data from similar 
systems.  It would be reasonable to expect a strong reliability 
growth program, test it - break it - fix it, to gradually reduce the 
high initial failure rate and approach the historical level of 
reliability for similar systems, but not the best case reliability.   
8 USE OF SIMILAR HISTORICAL DATA 
A similar system uses similar technology to perform a 
similar function in a similar environment. [4]  “Since field data 
on a similar-system is the best starting-point for quantification 
of the new-system reliability, it should be used to the maximum 
extent possible.” [4]   
There is a need for a “methodology that translates the 
observed value from the predecessor system to the conditions 
of interest for the new system.  This translation consists of 
beginning with the observed failure rate on the predecessor 
system and adjusting it to account for differences in complexity, 
temperature, environment, and processes.” [4]   
9 ACTUAL FAILURE CAUSES AND RATES 
Relatively few failures are due to components. This has 
been observed in electronic, military, and space systems.  
9.1 Electronic systems failure data 
Table 1 lists the predominant failure causes for electronic 
systems with the percentage of failures attributed to each of the 
them. [4]  Intermittent components lead to maintenance actions 
and are often replaced, adding to the logistics burden, so should 
be included in the failure rate. [4]   
Table 1 – Failure Causes for Electronic Systems  
Components 
(22%) 
Failure resulting from a part not 
performing its intended function. 
No defect (20%) Intermittent failures that cannot be 
reproduced. 
Manufacturing 
(15%) 
Failures resulting from errors in 
manufacturing. 
Induced (12%) Failures resulting from an externally 
applied stress such as environment or 
maintenance.   
Design (9%) Failures resulting from bad design.   
Wear out (9%) Failures resulting from wear out. 
Software (9%) Failure due to a software fault. 
System 
Management 
(4%) 
Failures to interpret system 
requirements or provide the 
resources required.   
 
9.2 Military and space systems failure causes  
A study of over 500 military systems found a consistent 
result, that "only 20% of the field problems encountered were 
hardware reliability problems." [2] It was also found that 
"human error is the cause for a large proportion (i.e., from 20 to 
50%) of all equipment failures.” [2]  Interfaces, the 
environment, system level problems, and human error “have 
historically caused the large majority of launch vehicle and 
spacecraft failures.” [8]   
10  DUANE-CROW RELIABILITY GROWTH 
Duane observed that if N(t) is the number of failures 
occurring until time t, the cumulative failure rate, N(t)/t, often 
declines as a fractional power of the cumulative test time, t.  The 
cumulative failure rate is  
N(t)/t = k t
-
   (1) 
The reliability growth rate is , the downward slope of 
N(t)/t versus t.  It usually varies from 0.2 to 0.6.  [9] [10]  
Crow provided a theoretical basis for the Duane model by 
assuming that failures occur according to a non-homogeneous 
(time-varying) Poisson process with a power law mean value 
function, m(t).  The mean number of failures over time is  
m(t) = k t

    (2)  
where  is between zero and one.  The expected cumulative 
failure rate is  
N(t)/t = m(t)/t = k t
-1    (3) 
The Crow and Duane reliability growth models are 
equivalent, with the Duane  equal to Crow’s 1 - .  The 
parameter k is the same in both.  The reliability growth 
parameters are usually estimated from the failure time data.  [9] 
[10] Here we will use a modified reliability growth model to 
estimate the initial failure rate as testing begins.   
10.1 Applying the Duane-Crow reliability growth model 
Crow used a 56 failure data set to illustrate reliability 
growth.  [11] A graphical Duane model fit to the data gives  
Duane N(t)/t = 0.640 t
-0.283
 (4) 
Crow’s computational analysis of this data, based on an 
assumed non-homogeneous Poisson process, found  
Crow N(t)/t = 0.217 t 
-0.073
   (5) 
The data and models are shown in Figure 2.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2.  Failure rate N(t)/t with Duane and Crow models 
 
The downward slopes showing reliability growth differ.   
The Crow model does not reflect the early infant mortality data 
and gives a barely noticeable projection of future reliability 
growth. 
10.2 Crow’s data does not show long term reliability growth 
Figure 3 shows the cumulative failure rate, N(t)/t plotted 
versus time, t, but in a linear rather than log-log graph.  A two 
part failure model is also shown, rather than the single model 
equation used by Duane and Crow.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3.  Cumulative failure rate 
A Duane-Crow model equation with N(t)/t = 1.11 t 
-0.5
 fits 
the data from time 0 to 100.  The high initial failure rate declines 
and becomes constant.  A flat line fits the data points from time 
100 to 400.  It is well known, and illustrated by the “bathtub 
curve,” that failure rates often decline strongly during an initial 
period of “infant mortality,” and then tend to be constant during 
the operational phase.  Using a Duane-Crow log-log line fit to 
the early data exaggerates the long term reliability growth 
potential, since the limiting failure rate is zero for large time.  
The best predictor of the long term failure rate would be the 
failure rate at the end of the reliability growth effort, assuming 
no “end-of-life” increase in failure rate occurs.  Reliability 
growth and long term operation have different failure rate 
behavior and require different models.   
11  THE abcd RELIABILITY GROWTH MODEL 
The explanation of failure mode correction suggests a two 
phase model of failure rate, an initial period of reliability 
growth and a later period of constant failure rate. 
11.1 Reliability growth components 
The expected components of a failure rate model are shown 
in Figure 4.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4.  The three failure rate components 
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There are three failure rate components in Figure4, a 
correctable and declining failure rate equal to 0.9 t
-0.5
, a 
constant random failure rate of 0.1, and a constant correctable 
but uncorrected failure rate.  At time equal to 50 time units, the 
failure correction process is completed.  A correctable failure 
rate of 0.13 remains, producing a constant total failure rate of 
0.23 after time 50.  Continuing to remove the remaining failure 
modes would have produced the continually declining failure 
rate shown.   
11.2 The abcd model 
The mathematical model in Figure 4 is  
Failure rate = 0.9 t
-0.5
 + 0.1 from t = 0 to 50  (6a) 
= 0.9 50
-0.5
 + 0.1 = 0.23 after t = 50         (6b) 
A simple abcd mathematical model for reliability growth 
and failure rate decline is  
Failure rate = a t
-b 
+ c from t = 0 to td   (7a) 
= d + c after td, where d = a td
-b
           (7b) 
The reliability growth effort continues and the failure rate 
declines until the time td when reliability improvement stops 
and the failure rate becomes constant.  Depending on td, most 
or only a few of the correctable failures will be removed.   
11.3 The abcd model for the Crow data set 
The abcd model is applied to the Crow reliability growth 
data set.  Figure 3 showed a rough fit to the Duane-Crow data 
set, with failure rate equal to 1.11 t 
-0.5
 to time 100.  The abcd 
model gives a better fit.   
Failure rate = 1.37 t
-0.99 
+ 0.14 from t = 0 to td = 100 (8a)  
= 0.01 + 0.14 = 0.15 after td = 100            (8b) 
The remaining correctable failures are few since the 
reliability growth time,  td = 100 is long compared to the 
random failure MTBF = 1/c =7.1.   
 
12  PREDICTING THE INITIAL FAILURE RATE USING 
THE abcd MODEL 
Reliability growth models were developed to predict the 
reliability improvement and test time that can be expected based 
on initial testing.  The model parameters of the reliability 
growth parameter and the required test time were obtained by 
curve fitting or computations based on the initial failure rate 
data.  Here we use the abcd reliability model to predict the 
initial failure rate, based on reasonable assumptions about 
reliability growth, test time, and the final failure rate. 
 
N(t)/t  = a t
-b 
+ c from t = 0 to td   (9) 
 
We assume that d, the remaining correctable failure rate, is 
y times the final long term failure rate, c.   
N(td)/td = a td
 -b 
= d = y c  (10) 
 
a = c y td
 b
   (11) 
 
The value of b depends on the design and can be estimated 
based on past experience.  The values of td and y reflect the 
reliability improvement period and the acceptable level of 
uncorrected failures that could be corrected, d = y c.  However 
td and y are strongly inversely related.  If td is doubled, the 
minimum MTBF of the remaining failure modes is also 
doubled, and this reduces d, the number of undetected 
correctable failures, and also reduces y.  This reduces the 
expected variation of the factor y td
 b
. The model is 
 
N(t)/t  = c y td
 b
 t
-b 
+ c from t = 0 to td (13) 
 
The initial failure rate at t = 1 is  
 
N(t)/t  = c y
 
td
 b
 + c  (14) 
 
Comparing this to the Duane-Crow data set model, b = 
0.99, c = 0.14 and td = 100.  The initial failure rate at t = 1 is 
1.37 + 0.14 =1.51, approximately equal to the first data point, 
1.43.  At td = 100, failure rate = c + d = 0.01 + 0.14 = 0.15.   
The reliability growth parameter b is typically 0.2 to 0.8.  
The long term constant failure rate c can be estimated as equal 
to the total component based failure rate.  The scale factor that 
multiplies c is y
 
td
 b
, and here is equal to 137/0.14 = 9.8.  
Comparisons to data indicate that this is a typical value.   
13 ESTIMATING THE RELIABILITY GAP 
The quantitative reliability gap data is very limited but 
consistent: 
• Failure rates can be 7 to 20 times higher than predicted 
using parts-based estimates. [2] [3]   
• Electronic components account for only 22% of failures.  
[4]   
• Only 20% of the field problems were hardware. [2]   
Experience indicates that the actual failure rate can be a 
factor of 5 to 10 even 20 times the traditional parts-based failure 
estimate.  This suggests that an estimate of the initial failure rate 
could be roughly 10 times the components-based failure rate.  
This might make sense if the parts count is a good indicator of 
general system complexity and that this correlates with the 
overall failure rate. However this seems implausible when we 
remember that the other failure causes include extrinsic factors 
such as environment and human error.  This requires only a 
minor adjustment to the usual easily obtained component-based 
failure rate estimate.  It seems that the only way to estimate the 
initial failure rate and reliability gap is to use the initial failure 
rate of similar systems, perhaps adjusted for degree of 
similarity.   
13.1 The reliability gap seems very unpredictable.  
The reliability growth model is based on the expectation 
that high probability failures will appear in early testing and be 
removed.  In the ideal case for failure rate prediction, all the 
failure modes would have constant failure rates.  Consider a 
group of high rate failure modes.  Which one happens first and 
when it occurs compared to its MTBF are random events.  
Testing identical systems can very easily produce different 
initial failure rates.  Then add the fact that environmental effects 
and human error are not constant, but may occur any time or 
never, and the initial size of the reliability gap seems very 
unpredictable.  
14  DISCUSSION 
Prediction errors can be expected.  “Reliability prediction 
is not a simple task and it is almost an impossible task for new, 
highly sophisticated, state-of-the-art equipment.” [2] However, 
failure rate estimates based on historical experience are less 
likely to be over-optimistic and more likely to be accurate.  
Unbiased failure rate estimates can help lead to better reliability 
specifications, planning, design, and testing and ultimately to 
better reliability.   
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